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NEGOTIATING FOR EU MEMBERSHIP? 
THE CASE OF BULGARIA AND ROMANIA
Pavlina Nikolova*
A treaty clause for enlargement has existed since the inception of 
the European Communities. Article 237 of the founding Treaty of Rome 
(1957) opened the possibility for any European state to apply and become 
a member. The legal basis for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, as 
well as other countries that formed part of the fi fth enlargement,1 was 
Article 49 of the Amsterdam Treaty (TEU), which stated that EU hopefuls 
had to adhere to the principles of liberty, democracy, rule of law, and re-
spect of human rights and freedoms. It also set the main steps on the way 
to EU accession - submission of an application to the Council, a positive 
Opinion by the Commission, accession negotiations, a unanimous deci-
sion by the Member States to accept the applicant after consultation with 
the European Commission and Parliament, ratifi cation of the Accession 
Treaty by the Member States and the acceding country. Over consecutive 
rounds of enlargement, the practice of taking in new members evolved 
beyond the Treaty provisions into a lengthy and complicated system.2 
Conditions for membership were defi ned unilaterally by EU Member 
States and progress towards accession depended on annual evaluations 
by the Commission and the European Parliament (EP).
This article turns back the clock to present the Bulgarian and Ro-
manian experience on the road to EU accession. Bulgaria and Romania 
were grouped together because of their common geographical location 
and the dubious course of domestic reforms in the fi rst years of tran-
sition. Their second-waver status was established with the Association 
(Europe) Agreements - the Visegrad states were given priority, while Bul-
garia and Romania signed their agreements under tougher conditions in 
1993.3 The two were left out of the Luxembourg group that opened mem-
bership talks in 1997 (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and 
* Pavlina Nikolova is a Visiting Lecturer in International Relations and a fi nal year PhD 
student at the University of the West of England at Bristol, Great Britain. She holds an MA 
in European Public Policies from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Strasbourg and a BA 
(Hons) in International Economic Relations from Varna University of Economics, Bulgaria.
1 Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Cyprus and Malta, hereinafter the ten new Member States.
2 G Avery and F Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union (Sheffi eld University 
Press, Sheffi eld 1998).
3 D Papadimitriou, Negotiating the New Europe: The European Union and Eastern Enlarge-
ment (Ashgate, Aldershot 2002).
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Slovenia) and were only invited to start accession negotiations in 2000. 
At the Laeken European Council in December 2001, it became clear that 
Bulgaria and Romania would not join the EU with the fi rst wave of ten 
states. The only other case in EU history of enlargement in two waves was 
the Mediterranean round - Greece joined in 1981 and Spain and Portugal 
in 1986. But in the Bulgarian and Romanian case, the EU defi ned sup-
plementary hurdles for opening negotiations and reserved the possibil-
ity to postpone membership even after the Accession Treaty was agreed. 
Such hurdles were not embodied in the EU founding Treaties nor were 
they applied to previous applicant states. Accession negotiations were the 
key mechanism for binding the EU and Bulgaria and Romania, but the 
two EU hopefuls had little bargaining leeway. Membership talks focused 
on the timescales for adopting existing EU legislation (acquis commun-
autaire), rather than on the adjustment of the Treaties to accommodate 
newcomers. Moreover, it was unlikely that the EU would offer Bulgaria 
and Romania more than it had agreed with the countries acceding in 
2004. But it was possible for the two second-wavers to be offered, and 
for them to accept, a less generous deal since they feared postponement 
or even cancellation of membership. In this context, the term accession 
“negotiations” may be misleading.
The article proceeds by examining critically the general conditions 
for membership as defi ned outside the Treaties in Member State decla-
rations. The enlargement process is then desegregated into three broad 
stages - the pre-negotiation stage, negotiations per se, and post-negotia-
tion. During the pre-negotiation stage, the compliance of Bulgaria and 
Romania with general political and economic criteria was verifi ed, and 
supplementary conditions for starting talks were specifi ed. The opening 
and closing of individual chapters during negotiations was conditional on 
more specifi c acquis criteria and involved the adoption of particular leg-
islative models and institutional templates. The post-negotiation phase 
spanned from the signing of the Act of Accession up until the actual date 
of membership and involved extensive monitoring of the implementation 
of obligations assumed by Bulgaria and Romania during negotiations. 
This article also examines the internal dimension of EU enlargement. In-
teractions among EU institutions at each stage of the enlargement proc-
ess have been somewhat neglected by the enlargement literature.4 Inter-
institutional dynamics were outside the remit of Bulgaria and Romania 
but had a direct effect on their membership prospects. Finally, some 
conclusions are drawn about the changing political and legal context of 
future EU enlargements.
4 G Harris, “The Continuing EU Enlargement Process: Inter-Institutional Aspects” (paper 
presented at the UACES 34th Annual Conference, Birmingham 2004).
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Membership criteria
The setting up of conditions for membership, or “conditionality” was 
at the heart of the EU’s active leverage for infl uencing political processes 
and state institutions in Bulgaria and Romania.5 Although the Treaties 
stipulate that any European state can apply to join, it was only in June 
1993 that Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) were offered 
the prospect of membership. In Copenhagen in 1993 the Heads of State 
and Government of the EU Member States made the historic declaration 
that the associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe “that so 
desire shall become members of the European Union”.6 However, it was 
the fi rst time in the history of EU enlargements that the carrot of EU 
membership was made explicitly conditional on the fulfi lment of criteria 
not specifi ed in the Treaties. The Copenhagen European Council con-
cluded that CEECs could join the EU only if they:
o achieved the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of mi-
norities (political criteria);
o established a functioning market economy and demonstrated ca-
pacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union (economic criteria);
o were able to take on the obligations of membership including ad-
herence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union 
the (acquis criteria); 
In addition to what became known as the Copenhagen criteria, the 
Union’s capacity “to absorb new members, while maintaining the mo-
mentum of European integration” was mentioned as a prerequisite for 
enlargement.7
The Copenhagen criteria for membership evolved outside the Trea-
ties to be the mainstay of the EU enlargement policy, not only towards the 
CEECs but also towards future applicants. At the start of his mandate in 
1999, the fi rst Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen declared 
that the Copenhagen criteria for membership were “fi xed criteria that 
could not be amended or made fl exible”.8 His successor, Commissioner 
Olli Rehn, on the occasion of the EP debate on Turkey’s application, re-
ferred to the Copenhagen criteria as “the fundamental values on which 
5 MA Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Commu-
nism (OUP, Oxford 2005).
6 European Council Presidency Conclusions 180/1/93 of 21-22 June European Council 
in Copenhagen < http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf> 
accessed 21 January 2003.
7 ibid 13.
8 Uniting Europe (6/09/99) 2.
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the European Union is based, [that] are not subject to negotiation”.9 The 
conditions for membership were extensively analysed in the enlargement 
literature and their ambiguity was emphasised.10 Karen Smith pointed 
out that how the EU evaluated progress in meeting the conditions and 
how it defi ned violations of the conditions were bound to be highly sub-
jective.11 Furthermore, the fulfi lment of the “safeguard” that the EU had 
to be ready for enlargement was beyond the control of Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. It mirrored the concern of incumbent members that enlargement 
or “widening” might threaten the EU’s functioning unless it was accom-
panied by appropriate institutional and policy reforms, or “deepening”.12 
The ability of Bulgaria and Romania not only to adopt, but also to 
apply, the acquis became a main concern for the EU as the accession 
process progressed. The Madrid European Council (1995) highlighted the 
need for candidate countries to adjust their administrative structures to 
ensure coherent operation of Community rules. The EU’s pre-accession 
strategy was revamped to assist candidates to that end. Subsequent Eu-
ropean Councils made it clear that accession preparations were not only 
about the speedy transposition of the EU acquis but also about the qual-
ity of its application. As Commission chief negotiator Eneko Landaburu 
commented, “what is important is not to speak of dates [of accession] 
but to get on with the job in proper and substantial manner”.13 The Feira 
and Gothenburg European Councils, in 2000 and 2001, respectively, re-
asserted that signifi cant efforts were required of CEE governments to 
strengthen their administrative and judicial capacity to apply the acquis. 
The Copenhagen European Council in 2002 endorsed the Commission’s 
proposal for continued monitoring of progress on the ground after the 
signing of the Accession Treaty and until Bulgaria’s accession.
It is unclear whether the EU recognised administrative capacity to 
be a fully fl edged condition for membership, a sort of bureaucracy crite-
rion. Dimitrova argued that the administrative capacity requirement was 
de facto defi ned as an accession criterion by the Commission in Opinions 
on membership applications by CEECs.14 Subsequent Regular Reports on 
9 O Rehn, “EU and Turkey on the Threshold of a New Phase” (speech by Commissioner 
Rehn, EP Parliamentary Session, Turkey Debate, 13 December 2004).
10 H Grabe and K Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards (RIIA, London 1998) 30; A Mayhew, 
Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (CUP, 
Cambridge 1998) 29.
11 KE Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Palgrave, Bas-
ingstoke 2004) 140.
12 N Nugent, “The Widening and Deepening of the European Community: Recent Evolution, 
Maastricht, and Beyond” (1992) 30 Journal of Common Market Studies 311, 328.
13 Uniting Europe (13/02/2000) 1.
14 AL Dimitrova, “Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU’s Administrative Capacity 
Requirement” (2002) 25 West European Politics 171,190; see also JP Olsen, “Towards a Eu-
ropean Administrative Space?” (2002) WP02/26 Arena Working Paper <http://www.arena.
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progress towards accession (1998-2001) comprised a separate section on 
administrative capacity to apply the acquis. The EU decision to re-target 
Phare support on administrative capacity building reaffi rmed the direct link 
between EU accession and administrative reform in candidate countries. In 
more recent work, Dimitrova suggested that administrative capacity was a 
“partial” condition or “subcondition” linked to both the fi rst, political, and 
the third, acquis implementation criteria for membership.15 Rather than 
being a separate requirement, administrative capacity building involved 
the improvement of horizontal capacity, or the strengthening of the public 
administration as a whole and at all levels (national, regional, local), and 
sectoral capacity building to implement the acquis covered by the thirty-one 
negotiation chapters. For Dimitrova, the horizontal capacity requirement 
was equivalent to institution building “as a kind of an institutional healing 
approach (…) in which the EU tries to fi x the ills and problems of postcom-
munist administrations”.16 Fournier described the EU’s administrative con-
ditionality as one of “variable geometry” since the requirement to establish 
democratic institutions was addressed rather fully, but the issue of organi-
sation of national public administrations was vaguely defi ned.17 Verheijen 
suggested that the innovative ingredient of the administrative capacity re-
quirement, as compared to previous rounds of enlargement, was the need 
for horizontal public administration reform in Bulgaria and Romania.18 It 
emerged as a major pre-condition for membership because of the increas-
ing complexity of the EU as a political system and the mutual depend-
ence of Member States in implementing EU rules.19 Yet Verheijen observed 
that the requirement for horizontal administrative reform was somewhat 
abandoned by the Commission in the early 2000s. The incoherence in the 
EU approach questions the extent to which general administrative capacity 
represented a true membership criterion. It might have been simply a tool 
for exerting pressure on candidate countries when necessary, one that the 
EU could turn a blind eye to when politically convenient20.
uio.no/publications/wp02_26.htm> accessed 3 November 2003; T Verheijen, “Les Critères 
Administratifs d’Adhésion à l’Union Européenne: Sont-ils Voués au Placard?” (2002) 33 
Revue d’Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest 79, 99.
15 AL Dimitrova “Europeanization and Civil Service Reform in Central and Eastern Europe” 
in F Schimmelfennig and U Sedelmeier (eds), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2005).
16 ibid 81.
17 J Fournier, “Administrative Reform in the Commission Opinions Concerning the Acces-
sion of Central and Eastern European Countries to the European Union” in OECD/SIGMA 
(ed), Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative Space (SIGMA Papers, 
OECD 1998) 114.
18 Verheijen (n 14)
19 Y Mény, P Muller and J-L Quermonne (eds), Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the Euro-
pean Union on National Institutions and Policies (Routledge, London 1996).
20 Verheijen (n 14)
398 Pavlina Nikolova: Negotiating for EU Membership? The Case of Bulgaria and Romania
The absence of concrete benchmarks against which readiness for 
membership could be evaluated led national governments to question the 
EU’s commitment to enlargement. Fears were voiced that the member-
ship criteria were formulated “to keep the doors of the Union closed”.21 In 
its composite document Agenda 2000, encompassing the Opinions on in-
dividual applications and an evaluation of the enlargement impact on key 
EU policies, the Commission itself recognised that its task in evaluating 
the candidates’ readiness for membership “was unprecedented because 
the Copenhagen criteria are broad in political and economic terms and go 
beyond the acquis communautaire (for example assessing administrative 
and judicial capacity), and because the acquis itself has expanded con-
siderably since previous enlargements”.22 The statement of the European 
Council in Luxembourg (1997) that compliance with the political crite-
ria was a “prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations”, 
but economic and acquis criteria “have been and must be assessed in a 
forward-looking, dynamic way”23 reaffi rmed the conviction of applicant 
countries that the admission of new members was a political act express-
ing political preferences.24 Past instances of EU enlargement, especially 
the Mediterranean round, provided further evidence of the political cal-
culus according to which each application was evaluated.25 In the case of 
Bulgaria and Romania, the Kosovo crisis contributed to the EU decision 
to open accession negotiations to give a positive signal to the Balkan re-
gion. The fuzziness of the accession criteria could therefore be “as much 
hindrance as facilitator” to a country’s membership of the EU.26
Pre-negotiation
The pre-negotiation phase spans from the moment of submission 
of the membership application to the start of accession talks. Romania’s 
and Bulgaria’s formal applications for membership were put forward in 
1995, at the June and December European Councils, respectively. The 
21 A Inotai, “The CEECs: From the Association Agreements to Full Membership”, in J Red-
mond and GG Rosenthal (eds), The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future (Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder CO and London 1998) 162.
22 Commission of the EC, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union (Bulletin of the 
EU, 5 Supplement 1997) 39. 
23 European Council Presidency Conclusions SN 400/97 of 12-13 December European 
Council in Luxembourg <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/
032a0008.htm> accessed 2 April 2006.
24 R Stawarska, “EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective” (1999) 6 Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 822, 838.
25 C Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union (Routledge, London 
1997).
26 P Nicolaides and A Close, “The Process and Politics of Enlargement”,1European Trends 
(1994) 70, 79.
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Opinions on Bulgaria and Romania’s applications published by the Com-
mission in July 1997 concluded that post-communist reforms in the 
two countries had not progressed suffi ciently and that accession talks 
could not be opened. In November 1997 the European Parliament recom-
mended that negotiations commence with all applicants from CEE but 
the European Council in Luxemburg (1997) decided to start talks with 
fi ve CEECs dubbed the Luxembourg group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia). It was only in December 1999 that Member 
States gathered in Helsinki decided to open talks with the remaining 
CEECs. Negotiations with the so-called Helsinki group (Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) were formally launched on 15 Febru-
ary 2000 at ministerial level. 
The pre-negotiation phase for Bulgaria and Romania was character-
ised by add-on EU conditionality. Grabbe argued that respect of human 
and minority rights was the minimum necessary to open membership 
talks and, indeed, to conclude any economic or political agreement with 
the EU.27 Thus, negotiations on the Trade and Association Agreement 
between the EU and Bulgaria were temporarily suspended in the late 
1980s due to Turkish minority rights violations by the Zhivkov commu-
nist regime.28 Although important, the fulfi lment of the political criterion 
was by itself not suffi cient for opening accession negotiations. The 1997 
Commission Opinions on Bulgaria and Romania indicated that compre-
hensive economic restructuring had to be under way and some level of 
acquis compliance had to be achieved before negotiations could begin. 
In its 1999 Composite Paper outlining the EU’s enlargement strategy, 
the Commission stated that the opening of negotiations with Bulgaria 
and Romania was conditional upon confi rmation of the economic reform 
process.29 Furthermore, the 1999 Composite Paper required Romania 
to reaffi rm its commitment to fi nance and implement structural reform 
of childcare institutions. The opening of negotiations with Bulgaria was 
contingent upon agreement of a timetable for decommissioning units 1 
to 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power station. Furthermore, before the sub-
stantial phase of negotiations with the two countries was launched, they 
had to pass a supplementary test of a “mini” progress report on their eco-
nomic situation.30 This add-on country specifi c conditionality gave rise 
27 H Grabbe, “How Does Europeanization Affect CEEC Governance? Conditionality, Diffu-
sion and Diversity” 8 Journal of European Public Policy (2001) 1013, 1031.
28 U Sedelmeier and H Wallace, “Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe”, in H Wal-
lace and W Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (OUP, Oxford 1996) 357.
29 Commission of the EC Composite Paper: Reports on Progress towards Accession by Each 
of the Candidate Countries [1999] <http://www.infoeuropa.ro/ieweb/imgupload/1999_
Composite_Paper.pdf> accessed 28 March 2006.
30 Uniting Europe (20/12/99) 2.
400 Pavlina Nikolova: Negotiating for EU Membership? The Case of Bulgaria and Romania
to concerns that the EU was not treating Bulgaria and Romania on an 
equal footing with other CEECs. The closure of Bulgaria’s sole nuclear 
power plant and main energy supplier Kozloduy was more controversial. 
In early 1999 the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov launched an overt 
attack on the EU and its “diktat” on Kozloduy nuclear power station, 
claiming that its closure would “destroy what little competitiveness the 
country now has”.31 But the Bulgarian stance weakened as the date for 
the EU decision on opening negotiations approached. In November 1999 
the Bulgarian Ambassador to the EU conceded that the country was will-
ing to strike a deal, before the December Summit in Helsinki, that was 
“mutually acceptable and realistically feasible” but the closure date de-
pended on “what the fi nancial compensation to Bulgaria for closing such 
a major energy source will be”.32 After the Commission declared its readi-
ness to grant Bulgaria’s energy sector substantial Phare assistance, a 
last-minute compromise was reached and negotiations with the so-called 
Helsinki group (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) were 
scheduled for 15 February 2000. 
The decision of the EU Member States to open negotiations is a cru-
cial step on the way to accession, because it indicates willingness to offer 
fully-fl edged membership. Gate-keeping the access to negotiations was 
therefore the most powerful tool of EU conditionality.33 The relative eco-
nomic backwardness of Bulgaria and Romania as well as the domestic 
salience of accession allowed the EU to add specifi c requirements to the 
general criteria for opening negotiations. This was an innovative approach 
and suggested that EU conditionality was toughening for new waves of 
applicants. However, if the EU was to achieve the desired reforms in Bul-
garia and Romania it had to maintain the long-term membership prom-
ise and provide some short-term rewards for compliance. The Romani-
an President Constantinescu emphasised that the uncertainty over the 
country’s prospects for membership was a major diffi culty in the course 
of internal reforms.34 To ensure that post-communist reforms were sus-
tained, the Member States decided to launch the accession process with 
all applicants in 1998, although only half of them started accession nego-
tiations. The Commission insisted that the two groups be called the “ins” 
and the “pre-ins”, as opposed to the “ins” and the “outs” to emphasise the 
inclusiveness of the accession process.35
With regard to the EU’s internal dynamics, the work carried out by 
the Commission was pivotal at the pre-negotiation stage. The Commis-
31 Uniting Europe (8/03/99) 5.
32 Uniting Europe (15/11/99) 3.
33 H Grabbe (2001).
34 Uniting Europe (20/12/99) 2.
35 Vachudova (n 5) 114
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sion played a leadership role when the EU was confronted with the sud-
den collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. 
While the Member States were hesitant about how to respond, the Com-
mission, drawing on experience with development programmes, set up 
the Phare fi nancial instrument and initiated negotiations on trade and 
cooperation agreements.36 As a guardian of the Treaties and a policy-
initiator, the Commission could set the agenda for Council of Ministers’ 
decisions, but could also infl uence the preferences of some Member 
States.37 At each step of the enlargement process, the Commission could 
act as a gate-keeper by publishing evaluations of applicants’ readiness 
to proceed to the next stage. The enlargement clause (Art. 49 TEU) re-
quired the European Commission to be consulted on each membership 
application before negotiations were opened. The Commission Opinions 
were not a legally binding document but aimed to assist the Council in 
deciding whether to open accession negotiations or not. However, they 
had proven to be quite infl uential when Member States were hesitant or 
diverged in views on how to proceed. Once the Commission had delivered 
a positive evaluation, it was diffi cult for the Council to back off, the most 
recent example being the decision to launch negotiations with Turkey. 
Only once in the history of EU enlargement had the Council overruled the 
Commission’s negative Opinion and decided to start membership talks 
with Greece to encourage domestic democratic reforms. 
The Luxembourg Council extended the Commission Opinions to an-
nual Regular Reports on progress towards accession. The Regular Re-
ports became the most infl uential document in the enlargement process 
- they were recognised by both Member States and applicant countries as 
fair overall evaluations of domestic reforms. They also provided a tool for 
the Commission to infl uence developments in Bulgaria and Romania by 
spelling out specifi c reforms that needed to be undertaken in each area 
of the acquis. A side-effect of the Commission’s annual evaluations was 
the accumulation by national administrations of knowledge in each area 
of the acquis while preparing the so-called national contributions to the 
Regular Reports. Furthermore, the one-year cycle of the Reports and the 
Accession Partnerships kept national authorities under pressure to add-
36 U Sedelmeier, “The European Union’s Association Policy Towards Central and East-
ern Europe: Political and Economic Rationales in Confl ict” (1994) 7 SEI Working Paper; U 
Sedelmeier and H Wallace (1996).
37 L Friis, “‘The End of the Beginning’ of Eastern Enlargement - Luxembourg Summit and 
Agenda-Setting” (1998) 2(7) European Integration Online Papers <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/
index.php/eiop> accessed 20 April 2004; BG Peters, “Agenda-setting in the European Un-
ion” in J Richardson (ed), European Union: Power and Policy-making (Routledge, London 
2001); MA Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda-
setting in the EU (OUP, Oxford 2003); SK Schmidt, “Only an Agenda Setter? The European 
Commission’s Power over the Council of Ministers” (2000) 1 European Union Politics 37, 
61. 
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ress issues identifi ed in the previous report so that evidence of progress 
could be included in the updated version. In September 2003, the Chair-
man of the Bulgarian Parliament suggested that extended plenary ses-
sions would be held to adopt several laws so that they could be taken 
into account by the Commission’s 2003 Report (Law on Discrimination, 
on Telecommunications and on Waste and Refuse Management). Priority 
was also given to amendments in the Penal Code, deemed necessary by 
the 2002 Commission Report.38 On the fl ipside, the time pressure and 
the daunting scale and number of required reforms sometimes led to the 
mechanical fi lling of gaps identifi ed in the Reports without prior impact 
evaluation and a clear strategy for reform.
Accession negotiations
The starting point for accession negotiations was the acquis commu-
nautaire, the body of policies and legislation developed over the years in 
Treaties and case law of the European Court of Justice. Negotiations were 
opened on several “easier” chapters out of the thirty-one chapters into 
which the EU acquis was divided. In the case of Romania, fi ve chapters 
were opened - SMEs, science and research, education and training, ex-
ternal relations, CFSP, while Bulgaria also tabled a position paper on cul-
ture and audiovisual policy. The most contentious chapters, those with 
fi nancial implications and the chapter on the free movement of persons 
were opened last, during the “hot phase” of the talks. Individual chapters 
were closed provisionally, when the majority of issues were settled, al-
though particularly sensitive points remained. Chapters could, therefore, 
be reopened by either side at any time and this constituted a potential 
threat to the swift ending of negotiations. Compromise on various sensi-
tive issues was reached during the “end game” when the applicants and 
Member States traded concessions on one chapter for counter-conces-
sions on another. Negotiations were declared closed only after a politi-
cally acceptable package deal was struck. The principles that governed 
accession negotiations were differentiation and catching up - each coun-
try was judged on its own merit and was given the opportunity to join the 
countries that were more advanced in the negotiating process. This cre-
ated competition among individual applicants and prevented them from 
forming a coalition that would have increased their bargaining power and 
possibly earned them better conditions of entry. The EU preferred to ne-
gotiate with several countries simultaneously so that peer pressure could 
be exercised, but to hold meetings with each applicant separately in the 
frame of country-specifi c Accession Conferences.39
38 Gerdzikov cited by Dnevnik.bg http://www.dnevnik.bg accessed 2 September 2003.
39 L Friis, “EU Enlargement...And Then There Were 28?” in E Bomberg and A Stubb (eds), 
The European Union: How Does It Work? (OUP, Oxford 2003).
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The group approach applied by the EU became of particular concern 
for Bulgaria because it had progressed more vigorously than Romania in 
the negotiating process.40 By late 2003 fears began to be voiced that Ro-
mania’s sub-optimal performance could hold Bulgarian accession back. 
It was clear from EU enlargement history that country-by-country acces-
sion was highly unlikely.41 Senior members of the EP shared Bulgaria’s 
worries. Liberal Group leader Graham Watson called in January 2004 
for decoupling to allow both countries to progress towards membership 
at their own pace.42 The EP rapporteur on Romania, Emma Nicholson, 
insisted that accession negotiations be suspended as Romania was in 
breach of the political criteria for EU membership. However, her proposal 
was not endorsed by the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee. The European 
Commission itself had always insisted that negotiations with both Roma-
nia and Bulgaria could be concluded by the end of 2004.43
Accession negotiations, unlike international negotiations, were asym-
metrical. The source of such asymmetry was the non-negotiable status of 
the Community acquis and the fact that applicants were in the position of 
demandeurs of membership. The experience of four enlargement rounds 
proved that the acquis principle was very durable, even though the depth 
and breadth of the acquis had expanded.44 For CEECs, the total to be 
transposed ran to some 85,000 pages of secondary legislation divided 
into 205 volumes and taking up more than three metres of shelf.45 That 
was not to say that negotiations did not actually take place, but only to 
emphasise the uniqueness of this process of the “external becoming in-
ternal”.46 Negotiations per se were not about the contents of the acquis 
but about the terms under which candidates adopted, implemented and 
enforced Community legislation. Bulgaria and Romania could require 
transitory exemptions in some areas - specifi ed and relatively short pe-
riods for the gradual adjustment of national provisions to the EU acquis 
followed by equal treatment.47 
40 In the post-negotiation phase, Romania speeded up preparations while Bulgaria fell be-
hind; however, this was still not the case at the time of the writing of this article.
41 Preston (n 25)
42 Uniting Europe (03/3/04) 8.
43 Commission President Romano Prodi, cited in Uniting Europe (03/3/04).
44 L Beurdeley, L’Elargissement de l’Union Européenne aux Pays d’Europe Centrale et Orien-
tale et aux Iles du Bassin Méditerranéen (L’Harmattan, Paris 2003) 38-41; Preston (n 25)
45 EU Publications Offi ce Newsletter 2 (2004) 3.
46 G Avery, “The Commission’s Perspective on the EFTA Accession Negotiations” (1995) 12 
Sussex European Institute Working Paper 1.
47 A Inotai, “Some Key Issues in Understanding the Negotiations on Accession to the Euro-
pean Union” (2001) 122 Hungarian Academy of Science Working Paper 18-20.
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The Commission in its Enlargement Strategy Paper classifi ed tran-
sitional requests into acceptable, negotiable and non-acceptable.48 Re-
quests were acceptable when the acquis required signifi cant and costly 
adjustments which could not be implemented prior to accession, par-
ticularly in the environment sector. Requests for transition periods in 
the area of the internal market and competition were generally unaccept-
able because they “could impair the proper functioning of the single mar-
ket”.49 All other requests were negotiable, as long as Bulgaria and Roma-
nia could justify, in their negotiating positions on the particular chapter, 
why a phasing-in period was necessary and why a particular date for full 
application was chosen. Then it was the task of the Commission to assess 
all the data provided by the national authorities, see what was done for 
new and old Member States, and come up with a Draft Common Position 
on the chapter under negotiation. However, it was unlikely that Bulgaria 
and Romania would get longer transition periods than those accorded to 
the ten new Member States.
Negotiations on chapters with fi nancial implications were highly con-
tentious for two reasons - the dual character of accession talks and the 
low level of economic development of Bulgaria and Romania. Accession 
talks required Member States to negotiate both internally, among them-
selves, and externally, with the applicants. The EU internal decision-mak-
ing dynamics, therefore, set the pace of accession talks independently of 
Bulgaria and Romania’s readiness. The basis for internal negotiations 
was a Draft Common Position (DCP) elaborated by the Commission for 
each chapter. The DCP had to be approved by the Council unanimously 
before it was put forward to the applicants. The Commission was blamed 
by both Member States and applicant countries for delaying negotiations 
because it did not present in time DCPs on substantial chapters such as 
agriculture.50 The Commission’s task was diffi cult because its proposals 
had to reconcile what the Member States were prepared to agree among 
themselves, what the applicants were ready to accept, and what was fea-
sible in an enlarged EU. Furthermore, discussions on Common Positions 
for fi nance-related chapters reopened old debates on EU spending poli-
cies, mainly the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural and Co-
hesion funds. The preparation of DCPs on individual chapters was co-or-
dinated by the Directorate General (DG) for Enlargement of the European 
Commission. The relevant sectoral DG led the technical work, while DG 
Enlargement as a super-co-ordinator organised inter-service consulta-
tions. Legally, the DCP was a “strange beast”, because it was not adopted 
48 Commission of the EC Enlargement Strategy Paper of 8 November (The European Com-
mission, Brussels 2000). 
49 Commissioner Verheugen quoted in Uniting Europe (6/09/99) 2.
50 Uniting Europe (22/5/2000) 1.
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formally by the College of the Commissioners and forwarded offi cially to 
the Council as any other Commission proposals would be. Instead, it was 
sent by DG Enlargement to the Council’s Enlargement Working Group 
as an informal paper or “non-paper”. It was discussed by the Working 
Group and then adopted as an EU Common Position by COREPER or 
national ministers.51 This indicated the uniqueness of the enlargement 
negotiations as their preparation happened outside the normal EU deci-
sion-making process.
Negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania on the fi nance-related 
chapters were delayed in early 2004 as incumbent Member States were 
wrangling over the global EU budget for 2007-13. However, the Com-
mission managed quite successfully to keep the adoption of the enlarge-
ment fi nancial package separate from a decision on a new EU fi nancial 
perspective. It proposed a fi nancial envelope for Bulgaria and Romania 
for 2007-9 following the same principles and methodology used for con-
cluding negotiations with the ten new Members. These included capping 
funding at 4% of national GDP per year and phasing in agricultural ex-
penditure. The fi nancial package was agreed by the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council on 22 March 2004 and allowed the Commis-
sion to develop DCPs on the chapters with fi nancial implications (agri-
culture, regional policy, budgetary provisions). The total budget available 
to Bulgaria and Romania for the period 2007-9 was set at just over 11.6 
billion (see Table).




BG RO BG RO BG RO
Structural operations 539 1399 759 1972 1002 2603
Rural development 183 577 244 770 306 961
Nuclear safety 70 0 70 0 70 0
Transition facility 30 52 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 822 2028 1073 2742 1378 3564
In June 2004 Bulgaria concluded discussions at the technical level 
on all individual chapters. Negotiations with Romania were closed only 
after a last-minute compromise was reached on the chapters Justice and 
Home Affairs, Competition and Environment. In October 2004 the Com-
51 Interviews with Commission offi cials (Brussels 20-22 April 2004).
52 Commission of the EC Report DG E 1/5859/05 on the Results of the Negotiations on the 
Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (Prepared by the Commission’s 
Departments, Brussels 2005).
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mission, in its Opinions, concluded that Bulgaria and Romania fulfi lled 
the political criteria for membership and were expected to fulfi l the eco-
nomic and legal criteria and be ready for membership by 1 January 2007. 
This paved the way for the formal closure of the accession negotiations 
with Bulgaria and Romania at the European Council of 16-17 December 
2004. The “end game” for Bulgaria and Romania was not as frantic as it 
was for the ten new Member States.53 The Union’s concessions could not 
go beyond what had been agreed with the fi rst wave.54 Financial conces-
sions were wrapped in the 31st Miscellaneous chapter, which provided 
for the establishment of a cash-fl ow and Schengen facilities to improve 
the budgetary positions of Bulgaria and Romania in the fi rst three years 
of accession. Over the period 2007-9, the two facilities would transfer 
some €240 million to Bulgaria and just under €560 million to Romania 
(2004 prices). Chapter 31 also provided for a €82 million transition facil-
ity for institution building projects and limited small scale investments, 
of which about €30 million was allocated to Bulgaria and €52 to Roma-
nia. Bulgaria was accorded supplementary funds for decommissioning of 
the Kozloduy nuclear power plant amounting to a total of €350 million for 
the period 2004-9.55
Post-negotiation
The post-negotiation phase is defi ned here as the period between the 
offi cial closure of accession negotiations and the actual date of entry. In 
this timeframe, EU hopefuls are labelled “acceding” states. After the clo-
sure of membership talks, the agreements reached between the EU and 
Bulgaria and Romania were incorporated in a joint Accession Treaty and 
put forward to the European Parliament for its assent. The Treaty was 
offi cially signed on 26 April 2005 and submitted to the acceding states 
and Member States for ratifi cation according to their own constitutional 
procedures. The Accession Treaty itself was a short document of six arti-
cles that listed the Member States and countries to join and set the date 
of accession at 1 January 2007. It was followed by an Act of Accession 
with a general part and nine bulky annexes laying down the conditions 
of membership negotiated by Bulgaria and Romania on each chapter of 
the acquis, together with the transitory arrangements. The Closing Act 
contained seven declarations, including those on the use of the Cyrillic 
script and the Bulgarian and Romanian languages as offi cial and work-
53 A Mayhew, “The Financial Settlement in the Enlargement of the European Union: Les-
sons for Romania” 3 (2003) Romanian Journal of European Affairs 5, 34.
54 H Grabbe, “The Copenhagen Deal for Enlargement” (Centre for European Reform Briefi ng 
Note 2002) < http://www.cer.org.uk> accessed 10 December 2003. 
55 Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Accession Treaty” <http://www.evroportal.bg/
topics.php?category_id=453> accessed 13 March 2006. 
407CYELP 2 [2006], pp. 393-412
ing languages of the Union. The signing of the Treaty of Accession opened 
a qualitatively different stage in relations between the EU and Bulgaria 
and Romania. First, as acceding countries they were accorded “active 
observer” status, allowing them to participate in meetings of EU institu-
tions and working parties, albeit without voting rights. The fi nal part of 
the Closing Act of Accession was dedicated to the “Exchange of letters” 
i.e. the interim arrangements for keeping Bulgaria and Romania up to 
date and taking into consideration their comments on the legislative and 
political initiatives of the EU bodies. Second, Bulgaria and Romania were 
held accountable by the EU for the implementation of commitments as-
sumed during the accession negotiations. The Treaty incorporated safe-
guard clauses and, for a fi rst time in EU enlargement history, a super-
safeguard allowing membership to be postponed for one year if a compre-
hensive monitoring report by the Commission established that the two 
countries had not kept their reform promises. 
The infl uence the EU can exercise on acceding states during the 
post-negotiation phase has by far been under-research. The reason might 
well be that for previous rounds of EU enlargement the Accession Treaty 
fi xed a membership date within one year of its signing. Safeguard claus-
es could only lead to a temporary moratorium on participation in some 
Community policies, but not to the postponement of actual membership. 
For Bulgaria and Romania, the post-negotiation period was much longer 
than for previous applicants - 18 months between the signing of the Ac-
cession Treaty and the earliest possible date of membership. Further-
more, the post-negotiation phase for the two countries was somewhat 
open-ended due to the possibility of revising the actual membership date. 
On one hand, the Copenhagen European Council in 2004 declared the 
fi fth enlargement irreversible and ongoing, and a Treaty was signed with 
Bulgaria and Romania guaranteeing their accession. On the other hand, 
national political elites had an interest in seeing their countries join 
sooner rather than later. Domestically, the attainment of accession in 
2007 became the benchmark against which the performance of the state 
institutions and the ruling party coalitions was evaluated. Failure to join 
in time could mean public discontent and loss of power. Moreover, the 
legal-institutional and political context of enlargement was changing and 
enlargement fatigue was evident in most Member States as the queue of 
EU hopefuls lengthened.
The most obvious expression of the changing legal context of EU en-
largement was the signing of a new Accession Treaty with Bulgaria and 
Romania, which incorporated an increased number of safeguard clauses 
to deal with unforeseen developments during the fi rst years of accession. 
Safeguards were strengthened for the ten new Member States as their so-
cio-economic and political situations differed signifi cantly from those of 
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previous rounds of applicants. The traditional safeguard clause covering 
cases of serious economic deterioration in particular sectors or areas was 
complemented by two further safeguards to be activated if new Member 
States failed to implement negotiation commitments in the areas of the 
internal market and judicial cooperation. The introduction of a super-
safeguard clause and enhanced monitoring for Bulgaria and Romania 
suggested greater concern on the EU side with implementation capacity 
and progress on the ground. New applicants from the western Balkans 
and Turkey observed that EU conditionality was toughening, and simple 
reform promises were no longer suffi cient for achieving membership.56 
Bulgaria’s Prime Minister warned that delaying his country’s member-
ship would signal a second-class treatment both to Bulgarian citizens 
and to neighbouring countries aspiring for EU accession. He insisted that 
joining in 2007 would be recognition for the reform efforts and adaptabil-
ity of Bulgaria and would provide an impulse for the war-ridden countries 
of the western Balkans to sustain democratic reforms.57 Bulgarian diplo-
mats expressed strong support for the integration of neighbouring states, 
provided the principles for the ten new Member States, notably progress 
according to their own merit, were maintained.58 This also meant that 
Romania and Bulgaria should not hold each other back on their way to 
membership. 
Another aspect of the changing legal context of EU enlargement was 
the higher probability of enlargement blockage after ten new members 
had joined. According to Art. 49 TEU, the accession of each country had 
to be approved unanimously by all incumbent Member States. The “One 
Europe” declaration, adopted at the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 by EU-
25, and later annexed to the Accession Treaty for the ten new members, 
promised full support for Bulgaria and Romania to join in 2007 (Phin-
nemore, 2004).59 However, in future enlargements outstanding border 
issues between new Member States and applicant countries could be a 
source of tension and vetoes. According to Art. 49 TEU, the Accession 
Treaty had to be ratifi ed by Member States according to their consti-
tutional provisions - in most cases done by national parliaments. This 
process was expected to be much lengthier because 25 parliaments were 
now involved instead of 15. Furthermore, ratifi cation by some countries 
could turn problematic, especially where the parliamentary majority had 
changed due to national elections and was now sceptical about enlarge-
56 <http://www.FT.com> accessed 3 October 2004.
57 <http://www.Europortal.bg> accessed 17 February 2006.
58 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Passy cited in Uniting Europe (10/3/04) 3.
59 D Phinnemore, “‘And Not Forgetting the Rest...’: EU(25) and the Changing Dynamics 
of EU Enlargement” (paper presented at UACES 34th Annual Conference, Birmingham 
2004).
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ment (for example Germany). The governments of Bulgaria and Romania 
invested considerable effort in touring the capitals of the Member States 
and lobbying the main political parties and actors to speed up the proc-
ess of ratifi cation.
The EU’s reluctance to involve Bulgaria and Romania in EU pol-
icy-making during the post-negotiation phase created uncertainty as 
to whether it was actually committed to accept them in 2007. After the 
signing of their Accession Treaty, the ten new members sent to Brussels 
a “shadow-Commissioner” to share a portfolio with the Commissioners 
from the incumbent Member States. Until March 2006, such an invita-
tion had not been extended to Bulgaria and Romania. Furthermore, the 
European Parliament delayed the invitation of national MPs - initially 
they were expected to join the EP immediately after the signing of the 
Accession Treaty in April 2005, as had happened with the ten new Mem-
ber States. Instead, MEPs decided to receive Bulgarian and Romanian 
observers from early 2006 or, if the two did not deliver on their reform 
promises, from January 2007. MEPs suggested that the delay was due to 
technical problems, namely space and translation issues. But the liberal 
leader Graham Watson said “this decision suggests more than reluctance 
to welcome Bulgaria and Romania into the EU” .60
Politically, the fi fth enlargement was driven predominantly by con-
siderations of “kinship” and the moral obligation to welcome CEECs back 
to Europe.61 The modest ceremony at which Bulgaria and Romania’s Ac-
cession Treaty was signed, with very few EU leaders present, compared 
with the grandeur of the ceremony for the previous group of ten CEE 
accessions, was a clear indication that the post-Cold War rhetoric of “his-
toric reunifi cation of the continent” was quickly fading. Furthermore, the 
economic appeal of Bulgaria and Romania was smaller because of the 
geographic distance and lower GDP per capita compared to the ten new 
Member States. Over time it was becoming increasingly diffi cult to evoke 
the same arguments and insist on the enlargement principles applied to 
the previous group of acceding CEECs. The attitude of the Member States 
and their citizens towards EU enlargement was also changing. The dete-
riorating economic situation in net contributors to the EU budget such 
as Germany made them unwilling to pay for enlargement. The French 
and Dutch no-votes on the European Constitution made the EU more 
concerned with deepening integration and with updating institutional ar-
rangements than with widening. The French Interior Minister and Presi-
dential candidate, Sarkozy, thus called for enlargement to be frozen until 
60 http://www.EUobserver.com accessed 6 May 2005.
61 H Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justifi cation in the EU’s En-
largement Policy” (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 491, 513.
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a watered down version of the EU Constitution was agreed. He also sug-
gested that France should hold referenda on future accessions to ensure 
that the concerns of its citizens had been fully taken into account.62 
EU internal decision-making processes were an important determi-
nant of relations with acceding countries. In early 2005, Bulgaria and 
Romania were held hostage to an EU inter-institutional confl ict over the 
technicalities of enlargement funding. The Council had included in the 
Accession Treaty fi nancial fi gures for enlargement without consulting the 
European Parliament, which is a co-decider on budgetary matters. The 
European People’s Party group, the largest fraction in the EP, threatened 
to postpone the vote on the Accession Treaty as a protest against the 
“violation” of the EP’s legislative and fi nancial powers.63 But a last-minute 
compromise was reached and MEPs voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
Bulgaria and Romania’s membership. Before holding the vote, MEPs ex-
tracted a promise from the Commission to be kept involved in the process 
of monitoring compliance with the obligations assumed in the accession 
negotiations. The monitoring process was “unchartered grounds” because 
it had not previously been used as a basis for deciding on the actual date 
of membership. According to the Treaty provisions (Art. 49 TEU), the EP’s 
role in the enlargement process should end with its assent on Bulgaria 
and Romania’s accession to the EU. MEPs insisted that decision-making 
practices established for other policy areas had to be followed and the 
Commission had to consult the EP before presenting the comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports on Bulgaria and Romania and before recommending 
the activation of the super-safeguard clause to the Council. EU hopefuls 
had to recognise the EP as an important veto-player at the post-negotia-
tion stage. Bulgaria, for example, used a public relations agency special-
ised in lobbing EU institutions to manage relations with it.
Conclusions
Negotiations for EU membership are highly asymmetrical as there 
are no reciprocal commitments on the EU side. The term “negotiations” 
may seem somewhat misleading because in practice only the timeframe 
for applying parts of the EU acquis is negotiable. Furthermore, member-
ship negotiations are two-dimensional - talks with applicant states are 
preceded by complex inter-institutional processes and cumbersome ne-
gotiations among Member States. EU internal dynamics, therefore, sets 
the pace of the enlargement process independently of applicant states. 
The fi fth round of EU widening, and the Bulgarian and Romanian expe-
rience in particular, reconfi rmed the non-negotiability of the EU acquis 
62 <http://www.EUobserver.com> accessed 13 January 2006.
63 <http://www.EUobserver.com> accessed 13 April 2005.
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but also ascertained the increasing importance of the stages preceding 
and following the accession negotiations. The EU itself underwent a steep 
learning curve when devising enlargement policies for CEECs and would 
apply this newly gained “knowledge” to other poor neighbours with fragile 
democracies. What conclusions can then be drawn for future EU enlarge-
ments?
The criteria for membership set unilaterally by EU Member States 
in Copenhagen in 1993 remain the minimal threshold to be met by fu-
ture applicants. However, the pre-negotiation experiences of Bulgaria 
and Romania and more recently of Croatia and Turkey proved that the 
Copenhagen criteria are not “one-size-fi ts-all” requirements. They had to 
be topped up with specifi c demands on a country-by-country basis (for 
example, cooperation with the ICJ in the case of Croatia). Since the open-
ing of accession negotiations is an important milestone for all EU hope-
fuls, the EU will continue to use it as a powerful leverage for infl uencing 
domestic politics. With regard to negotiations per se, closure of negotiat-
ing chapters would depend on what has actually been accomplished on 
the ground rather than on what has been promised or what is about to 
be launched. In this context, the administrative and judicial capacity 
of candidate countries to implement and enforce the acquis would be a 
benchmark for assessing membership readiness. Furthermore, monitor-
ing during the post-negotiation stage is likely to be more stringent to en-
sure that EU hopefuls do not relax their reform efforts once membership 
is “in the bag”. The super-safeguard clause had arguably become one of 
the mainstays of the EU enlargement policy, allowing the EU to give an 
irreversible political promise of membership, but to take time to ensure 
that technical requirements are met in full before the actual date of ac-
cession. It is therefore possible to see in the future even longer post- ne-
gotiation phases than in the case of Bulgaria and Romania. 
The major threat to future rounds of enlargement remains the extent 
to which widening can be reconciled with deepening. The other key de-
terminant is the economic situations of candidate countries and Member 
States. The accession of applicants with GDP well below the EU average 
depends on the ability and willingness of incumbent Member States to 
pay more into the EU budget or to give up current benefi ts. Better-off 
countries and potential net contributors, on the other hand, are more 
than welcome in the EU. The rejection of the European Constitution by 
France, one of the founding members of the EU, signalled a widening gap 
between the governing political elites and the European public. This may 
compel national governments to make the enlargement process more 
democratic. The peoples of the ten new Member States were given the op-
portunity to have their say on accession, and the same should not be re-
fused to the peoples of incumbent Member States. However, the fact that 
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the EU handles candidate countries in a group manner poses the danger 
of some countries being rejected in enlargement referenda only because 
they have been grouped with the “wrong” applicant. Moreover, referenda 
on enlargement may have a negative impact on European integration if 
they are used by Member State governments to threaten or put off future 
applicants. On the positive side, referenda may allow for an honest de-
bate about the costs and benefi ts of admitting each applicant and thus 
help close the gap between EU politicians and citizens, making the EU 
more accountable and democratic.
